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Your reviewer of my MacArthur’s War in the Winter 2001 issue [Dr. Donald
Chisholm, of the Naval War College] must have had a bad-hair day. Not a single
one of his nit-picking corrections, some of them already altered in the next
printing, relate to the thrust of the book (largely ignored in the inter-
est of demonstrating his superior naval expertise), which was that
General MacArthur bungled the command of the Korean War by failing
to run a hands-on operation and by a pattern of willful and arrogant
insubordination.
His technicality that the Japanese minesweepers and crews were not
really part of the Imperial Navy obscures the immorality of employing
them in a war operation at Wonsan in which at least one ship and crew
were casualties.
And he missed at least one more error as crucial to MacArthur’s misman-
agement as the rest—now corrected in the paperback reprint. The shiny new ve-
hicle in which the general rode to Haneda Airport as he was exiting Japan was a
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THEY WOULD HAVE FOUND A WAY
Sir:
The essay by Parshall, Dickson, and Tully in this issue [pages 139–51] was both a
critique of my article “The Battle of Midway: Why the Japanese Lost” [Summer
2000, pp. 60–100] and an exposition of their own theory of why the Japanese
could not get a strike force launched from their carriers at Midway before those
carriers were bombed at 1025 on 4 June. I wish to respond to certain points of
their critique of my article and then offer some comments on their theory.
First, I want to commend the authors for producing a most interesting essay.
They and I share the belief that the conventional American scenarios of what
happened on the Japanese carriers that fateful morning do not make sense, and
they as well as I have attempted to fashion more plausible scenarios—based on
more recent Japanese sources—to explain why Admiral Nagumo could not get a
“grand scale” attack launched. In that endeavor we have come up with very dif-
ferent explanations on certain points, though we agree on others. As one of the
purposes of my article was to stimulate critical analysis of the subject, I welcome
alternative points of view in the hope that from the clash of ideas a better under-
standing of what really happened on the Japanese side of that battle will eventu-
ally emerge.
Indeed, the authors have made me rethink some of my conclusions. I have
even been persuaded to concede one point that affects the timing in my scenario
for the operation to rearm the torpedo planes and dive-bombers on the Japanese
carriers. I now accept that the second-wave planes were already in the hangars
when Nagumo’s order to rearm them was given at 0715. Even had they been
spotted on the flight decks soon after the first wave departed for Midway, I now
believe that when the first American attack wave from Midway was anticipated
(Nagumo knew before 0600 that his carrier force had been spotted), they would
have been struck below to free the flight decks for combat air patrol (CAP) activ-
ity. The Japanese record of Zeros on CAP being recovered around 0700 on Akagi
and Hiryu substantiates this. This has the effect of advancing my rearming
schedule for Akagi by the time it would take to get the first few torpedo planes to
their arming stations in the hangar. (As I have the rearming process commenc-
ing on each plane as it reaches its arming station—about six minutes for the first
one, twelve minutes for the sixth—rather than waiting until the entire squadron
was lowered, the net advancement would be about ten minutes.)
This does not, however, vitiate my key point, which is: If Nagumo did not
receive the Tone 4 sighting report until 0800, instead of 0740 as commonly as-
sumed, the rearming operation would have proceeded twenty minutes longer
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before suspension or reversal than under the conventional scenario. As a result,
under my original rearming schedule, all the torpedoes would have been re-
moved by 0800, not only constraining Nagumo’s options at 0830—when a deci-
sion had to be made whether or not to launch a strike against the American
carrier force—but leaving much more to do after 0830 to restore the torpedoes
than if the rearming operation had been reversed at 0745.
Under a schedule advanced by around ten minutes, even more would have
been done by 0800—land bombs would probably have been installed on the first
chutai (division) of torpedo planes on Akagi. This would have left even more
work to be done after 0830 to reinstall the torpedoes—resulting in Nagumo’s
1030 deadline for launch being delayed even longer than under my original
schedule. However, this does not negate my supposition that had Nagumo re-
versed the rearming operation at 0745, as claimed in the conventional scenarios,
there probably would have been time to restore the torpedoes in time for a
launch to have taken place by 1000.
Having lauded the authors, and even having conceded a substantial point to
them, I now turn to some points in their critique of my article that I think are in
error.
They dispute my hypothetical assertion that the respotting of the torpedo
planes on the flight decks of Akagi and Kaga could have begun at 0920 had they
been rearmed with torpedoes (which I contend would have been possible had
the rearming operation been reversed at 0745, as has been claimed). They refute
this by saying (on p. 145) that this would have been prevented by “the high
tempo of CAP operations”during the period commencing at 0920. They say that
at 0920 “the Japanese were alert to a constant stream of incoming American
strikes. Until the coast was reasonably clear, and his CAP well stocked with fresh
fighters to last through the spotting process, Nagumo cannot have been ex-
pected to spot his strike.”
I believe this to be overstated. At 0920, Nagumo was aware that one Ameri-
can torpedo bomber squadron was approaching his carrier force (with dive-
bombers expected soon to follow.) He had no reason at that time to expect a
“constant stream of incoming American strikes.” As for CAP operations during
the period after 0920—five Zeros were launched at 0932 and three more at
0945—they were not an impediment to spotting attack planes on the flight deck
aft. Although the authors state (on p. 143) that planes would not “usually be
spotted aft during fighter takeoff operations” (their emphasis), they give no
logical reason why this could not be done if there was a compelling reason to do
so. Their note accompanying this statement says, “Any strike force spotted aft
would likely have contained a fighter escort of some sort, requiring Zeros to be
brought up from the forward section of the hangars via the forward elevators,
I N M Y V I E W 1 5 9
3
Weintraub and Isom: In My View
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001
thereby obstructing the flight deck for takeoffs in any case.” Only three Zeros
from each carrier were to be used for escort. One would think that they could be
brought up after the last CAP Zero to be launched prior to 1000 had taken off;
that would have been at 0945. There is no reason why they would have had to be
spotted at the same time as the first attack planes were spotted aft. Thus, there is
no good reason given why Nagumo could not have begun spotting his strike on
the flight decks at 0920 had they been ready (which, of course, they were not).
As for my assertion that had (hypothetically) the strike force been ready to
launch at 1000, it could have been launched during the fifteen-minute “window”
between attacks on the Mobile Force, the authors (on p. 145) counter as follows:
“This is wrong on several counts. First, we know that Akagi landed a CAP fighter
at 0910 and two more at 0951, meaning that even if there had been strike aircraft
on deck at 0920 (which we think unlikely in any case), they had to have been
moved back down into the hangar by 0951.” They seem to be saying that a “grand
scale” strike would have been aborted—and the strike planes stricken below—in
order to land two Zeros on CAP at 0951! I believe that most people would as-
sume that the recovery of those two Zeros for reservicing would have been post-
poned until the strike was launched. The authors err in assuming that because
Zeros on CAP were landed when no strike was spotted, those Zeros would have
also been landed in different circumstances—such as when a launch of strike
aircraft was imminent.
The authors continue: “Also, Isom clearly does not factor in the immutable
time costs associated with spotting and engine warm-up—a ‘fifteen-minute
window between attacks’ simply does not suffice.” My hypothetical case assumes
that the strike planes would already have been spotted by 1000, and with the en-
gines of all but the last few planes brought up already being warmed up. The en-
gines on those last few planes could be warmed up while the planes in front of
them were being launched. In view of this, fifteen minutes would have sufficed
to launch the strike had it been ready (as I posit it would have been had the re-
arming operation been reversed at 0745).
The authors go on to say that I ignore “Nagumo’s own estimate that the strike
force would be ready at 1100, although a 1030 takeoff was hoped for, if things
went well. Launching at 1000, though, for all the reasons cited above, was never
even remotely in the cards, and Nagumo knew it.” Here, they appear to have con-
fused the two rearming scenarios I have been comparing: the one that would
have resulted had Nagumo received the Tone 4 sighting report at 0740—as
conventionally assumed—as opposed to the rearming schedule that probably
actually resulted from his not receiving it until 0800, and reversing the rearming
operation after that time.
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The 1030 scheduled launch time was a consequence of the actual (and later)
reversal of the rearming operation—and of course, a 1000 launch time was “not
in the cards.” But my point was that it well might have been had the rearming op-
eration been reversed at 0745. (Incidentally, the authors have misread Nagumo’s
statement in his official report. Nagumo states, on page 7 of that report, that he
was advised that the torpedo-equipped attack planes in Carrier Division 1
(Akagi and Kaga) would be ready for takeoff at 1030, and that the torpedo planes
in Carrier Division 2 (Hiryu and Soryu)—which had returned from the Midway
strike—would be ready by 1030–1100. These latter planes would be in a strike
group separate from the one he hoped to launch at 1030, which included the tor-
pedo planes only of Carrier Division 1.)
Having lambasted the authors on the preceding points, I now want to con-
cede another point to them. In their next paragraph (on p. 145) they state: “Fur-
thermore, the assertion that two-thirds of Akagi’s torpedo planes were on deck
at 1000 is clearly wrong.” Here, I believe the authors are correct. My recon-
struction of the actual rearming schedule was premised on the second-wave
planes being lowered to the hangars after Nagumo’s rearming order was issued
at 0715. As discussed earlier, I now accept that they were already in the hangars at
0715. As this would have advanced the rearming schedule by at least ten min-
utes—requiring even more work to be done to reverse it after 0830—it would
have resulted in fewer torpedo planes being ready for respotting by 1000.
Whether or not any of Akagi’s torpedo planes actually got up to the flight deck
before it was bombed is, despite Senshi Sosho’s claim, still debatable (though I
am now convinced that none of Kaga’s were on the flight deck).
Now for a few comments on the authors’ theory of why Nagumo could not get a
“grand scale” strike launched before his carriers were bombed at 1025. They con-
tend that beginning with several minutes before 0700 and running until 1030, the
need to keep the flight decks free for CAP activity prevented the spotting of strike
planes for a launch at all times during that (three-and-a-half-hour) period. Such a
launch was precluded, they say, because it would require forty minutes to raise and
spot a squadron of torpedo planes or dive-bombers, plus additional time to warm
up the engines and make the launch—adding up to nearly an hour. (It is said that
the Zeros on CAP could not be deprived of servicing or reinforcements for that
long.) They conclude that the inability of Nagumo to launch a strike “hinged nei-
ther on whether Nagumo received Tone 4’s message at 0740 or at 0800, nor on how
quickly the armorers in the Japanese hangars could do their work.”
The implications of this theory are astonishing. According to its logic, Nagumo
would not have been able to launch a grand-scale strike against the American
carrier force even had he not rearmed his second-wave torpedo planes and
dive-bombers for a second strike on Midway, and even if he had received the
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Tone 4 sighting report immediately after it was sent at 0728, and even if a more
thorough search effort had discovered the American carriers at 0700. The blun-
ders committed in rearming, search, and communications operations, which
have been blamed by Japanese as well as American historians for the debacle that
befell Nagumo, were—we are told—irrelevant. Even if Nagumo’s torpedo planes
had been properly armed at 0700, the authors contend, they could not have been
launched, because they were in the hangars at that time and could not have been
raised and spotted on the flight decks before 1030—until the American attacks
were over.
This theory, which completely finesses my analysis and that of many others,
is in my view simplistic. While the authors are to be commended for bringing
to light complications in Japanese carrier operations caused by CAP activ-
ity—complications underappreciated by commentators on the battle, including
me—they have applied certain elements of their theory much too rigidly.
First, regarding elevator operations: They contend that forty minutes was re-
quired to raise from the hangar and spot on the flight deck a squadron of planes.
Although it could take forty minutes to raise and spot a squadron of torpedo
planes on Akagi, this was true only if one elevator (the aft one) was used. Only
the aft elevator could be used when a full air group was in the hangar, as
dive-bombers would block the use of the midship elevator for raising torpedo
planes. (This would have been the case after 0900, when the Midway strike
dive-bombers, having returned, were stowed in the hangar.)
However, several Japanese veterans of the battle whom I interviewed stated
that if the dive-bombers were already aloft—as Akagi’s were after the Midway
strike force departed—the middle elevator could also be used to raise (or lower)
torpedo planes in an emergency. Likewise, when Hiryu’s and Soryu’s torpedo
planes were aloft (such as before 0900), the aft elevator on those carriers could be
used to raise dive-bombers. (Unlike Akagi’s aft elevator, the ones on those carriers
were large enough to accommodate dive-bombers.) This would reduce the elevator
time by almost half. Also, the elevators on the newer Hiryu and Soryu were faster
than those on Akagi and Kaga. Dive-bombers on those carriers could be raised and
spotted in less than forty minutes even if only one elevator was used. Thus, it did not
always, on all carriers, take forty minutes to raise and spot a squadron of bombers.
This faster elevator operation for the dive-bombers on Hiryu and Soryu is im-
plied by Senshi Sosho (the official Japanese history of the battle, which the au-
thors appear to accord a great deal of credibility). It states (on pages 289–90)
that the dive-bombers could have been launched very soon after 0830 (and
Minoru Genda, Nagumo’s air officer, states that at least some of those bombers
were already on the flight decks at around 0830). But the authors, rigidly ap-
plying what they believe to be Japanese carrier doctrine, state (on p. 146) that
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the “dive bombers were all in their hangars at the time and would have taken an-
other forty minutes to put in action, even if they had been rearmed.”
Yet Genda, Ryunosuke Kusaka, and Tamon Yamaguchi thought that the
dive-bombers could be launched soon after 0830. Even if they were in the han-
gars at 0815, those Japanese officers apparently relied upon a fairly quick raising
of them to the flight deck, utilizing two high-speed elevators on each of the car-
riers. For the authors to insist that only one elevator could be used for each
squadron of bombers and that it would invariably take forty minutes to raise
and spot them on the flight deck regardless of the circumstances and gravity of
the emergency is, in my opinion at least, much too extreme.
Second, regarding CAP operations: Although they clearly constrained deck-
spotting operations of the bombers, the constraints were not as absolute as the
authors maintain. I have already pointed out that CAP takeoffs did not prevent
the spotting of bombers aft. Landings of Zeros for reservicing did require a free
flight deck aft, but there was much more flexibility than the authors allow. For
example, they state that as Hiryu recovered CAP at 0840 “even if strike planes
had begun to be promptly brought up on Hiryu after the American B-17s de-
parted at 0815, they would have had to be stowed below again by 0840.” Again, I
believe most people would assume that landing of the Zeros would be postponed
until the strike had been launched. To suggest that a strike ready to go would be
aborted in order to land some Zeros on CAP seems much too dogmatic.
Thus, we are told that even the option of a launch of dive-bombers alone at
0830—an option that Nagumo has been roundly criticized for not taking up—was
in fact actually precluded by Japanese carrier doctrine relating to elevator opera-
tions and CAP. Likewise, we are told that this carrier doctrine precluded the
spotting of a strike between 0920 and 1000 and its launch during the “window”
between 1000 and 1015, even had one been ready.
While an underappreciation of the constraints that CAP operations placed
on strike plane operations may have been the greatest weakness in my analysis, it
seems to me that dogmatism by the authors regarding Japanese carrier doctrine
is the greatest weakness in their essay. I still believe that Nagumo and Genda
would have found a way to spot and launch a strike before 1025 had one been
ready. Therefore, I still believe it relevant to inquire why one never got ready.
DALLAS WOODBURY ISOM
London, United Kingdom
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